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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises from a civil suit based on diversity 
jurisdiction brought by appellee, Fannie Harrison ("Harrison"), 
against appellant, Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A. ("Nissan"), 
seeking damages for alleged defects in the 1994 Nissan Sentra 
that Harrison purchased on July 11, 1994.  Nissan moved to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to "first resort" to the 
informal dispute resolution procedure provided by Nissan pursuant 
to the Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law, 73 P.S. § 1951 et seq. 
(Purdon 1993).  The district court denied the motion, and also 
denied Nissan's subsequent motion for reconsideration.  Nissan 
has appealed from both orders. 
 Harrison submits that, because the district court has 
not entered a final order, the appeal should be dismissed for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction.  Nissan rejoins that we have 
appellate jurisdiction under § 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 16, which allows an interlocutory appeal of 
an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.  
Nissan argues that appellate jurisdiction lies under this 
provision because its motion to dismiss was a surrogate for a 
motion to compel arbitration.  Harrison takes issue with this 
characterization, and also contends that the FAA does not apply 
to the informal ADR procedure provided by Nissan under the Lemon 





functional equivalent of a motion to compel arbitration because 
we agree with Harrison’s latter contention, and hence we will 
dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
 I. 
 Under the Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law ("Lemon 
Law"), "any purchaser of a new motor vehicle who suffers any loss 
due to nonconformity of such vehicle as a result of the 
manufacturer's failure to comply with this act may bring a civil 
action."  73 P.S. § 1958.  However, the law requires the claimant 
to "first resort" to any alternative dispute resolution 
procedures that the manufacturer has established before 
initiating litigation.  Id. § 1959.1   
 By the terms of the Lemon Law, id., before a consumer 
must “first resort” to it, the alternative dispute resolution 
procedure provided by the manufacturer must comply with the 
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") regulations, 16 C.F.R. pt. 703, 
promulgated under a cognate federal act, the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.  The most important of 
                     
1.  The statute provides: 
If the manufacturer has established an informal dispute 
settlement procedure which complies with the provisions 
of 16 C.F.R. Pt. 703, as from time to time amended, the 
provisions of [73 P.S. § 1958] shall not apply to any 
purchaser who has not first resorted to such procedure 
as it relates to a remedy for defects or conditions 
affecting the substantial use, value or safety of the 
vehicle.  The informal dispute settlement procedure 
shall not be binding on the purchaser and, in lieu of 
such settlement, the purchaser may pursue a remedy 
under [§ 1958]. 





these regulations for purposes of the case at bar requires 
alternative dispute resolution "mechanisms" to render a decision 
within forty days of notification of the dispute.  Id. § 
703.5(d).  The regulations provide that a “requirement that a 
consumer resort to the Mechanism prior to commencement of an 
action . . . shall be satisfied 40 days after notification to the 
Mechanism of the dispute or when the Mechanism completes all of 
its duties under . . . this section, whichever occurs sooner.”  
Id. § 703.5(i).2  
 Nissan has contracted with the Better Business Bureau 
("BBB") to provide a mechanism, the BBB “Auto Line,” that will 
satisfy the alternative dispute resolution provisions of both the 
Pennsylvania Lemon Law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  The 
contract between Nissan and the BBB provides that the Auto Line 
program will provide arbitration services that comply with the 
FTC requirements described above.3  
                     
2.  This provision refers explicitly only to the "resort" 
requirement of §110(d) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  We 
find, however, that this provision also applies to the "first 
resort" requirement of the Lemon Law.  As explained in the text, 
the FTC regulations were promulgated only with the Magnuson-Moss 
Act in mind, but the Lemon Law requires that qualifying 
mechanisms comply with the FTC regulations.  Hence, these 
regulations apply to Lemon Law ADR even if they reference only 
the Magnuson-Moss Act explicitly. 
3.  Harrison contends that the BBB Auto Line program does not 
comply with 16 C.F.R. pt. 703; inter alia, she relies on a letter 
written by a FTC investigator.  Nissan responds that the 
investigator's letter is taken out of context and has no 
relevance to the point for which Harrison submits it.  Nissan 
also submits that, at all events, the BBB Auto Line informal 
dispute resolution mechanism is used nationally by several 





 The warranty that accompanies Nissan's vehicles 
describes the BBB Auto Line as a remedy available to consumers 
who are dissatisfied with their vehicles' performance.4  The 
warranty informs consumers how to register their complaints with 
the BBB Auto Line and what information to provide.  It also 
explains that the BBB Auto Line has both a mediation and an  
arbitration component.  If the complaint cannot be mediated, the 
consumer can present the matter to an impartial person or a 
three-person arbitration panel.  The arbitrators' decision is not 
binding unless the consumer accepts it as binding.  While the 
warranty states that resort to the BBB Auto Line is completely 
voluntary, it also notes that some state laws require resort to 
the program before filing a lawsuit. 
 Harrison, through counsel, sent to the BBB Auto Line a 
request for arbitration, dated August 16, 1994, which claimed 
that her 1994 Nissan Sentra did not comply with the warranty.  
The Sentra allegedly had a faulty engine, air conditioner, and 
steering system, as well as other defects.  Harrison requested a 
(..continued) 
all such mechanisms are audited "at least annually, to determine 
whether the Mechanism and its implementation are in compliance 
with this part."  Id. § 703.7(a).  It points out that the 
attorney charged with insuring that the BBB Auto Line is in 
compliance with the FTC regulations has testified that neither 
the FTC nor any state has ever found the BBB Auto Line program to 
be wanting.  In the final analysis, however, that question is for 
the FTC, and not this Court, to decide. 
4.  A copy of the warranty was submitted after this Court asked 
the parties to supplement the record pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 






refund of her purchase price, approximately nineteen thousand 
dollars.  After forty days had passed without a response, at 
least according to Harrison, she filed a diversity-based civil 
suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, against Nissan in the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Harrison's five-count 
complaint pled a Pennsylvania Lemon Law claim, a Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act claim,5 a Uniform Commercial Code claim, a 
detrimental reliance claim, and a Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") claim.  Harrison 
asserts that her UTPCPL claim, under which she could be awarded 
three times the amount recoverable under the Lemon Law (the 
purchase price of the car), see 73 P.S. § 1955 (Purdon 1993); id. 
§ 201-9.2, allows her to satisfy the amount in controversy 
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.   
 Nissan moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1).  It argued that the Lemon Law claim should be dismissed 
because the “first resort” provision requires that a claimant 
fully exhaust the available ADR procedures, in this case the BBB 
Auto Line, before filing suit.  Because, according to Nissan, the 
BBB Auto Line had responded to Harrison’s request for arbitration 
and she had failed to take action, she had not satisfied this 
                     
5.   Although the Magnuson-Moss Act is a federal law, a private 
enforcement action cannot be brought in federal court unless the 
value of all of the claims in the suit is at least $ 50,000. 15 





exhaustion requirement.  In Nissan's submission, if the Lemon Law 
claim was dismissed, Harrison could no longer assert an UTPCPL 
claim, and thus the amount in controversy would no longer meet 
the $50,000 statutory requirement.  Under these circumstances, 
the district court would lack subject matter jurisdiction.   
 In response, Harrison contended that there is no such 
exhaustion obligation, reasoning that the Lemon Law is a consumer 
statute that imposes burdens on manufacturers, but not on 
claimants, and that the regulations promulgated under the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act clearly imply that the customer need 
only make the initial notification.  Harrison repeated her 
allegation that she had never received a response from the BBB 
Auto Line. 
 The district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
reasoning that, taking the facts of the complaint as true, 
Harrison had sufficiently resorted to the alternative remedies 
under the Lemon Law before filing her complaint.  In doing so, it 
relied upon the opinion in Polischchuk v. Nissan Motor Corp. in 
U.S.A., Civ. No. 94-6771, 1995 WL 94798 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1995). 
 In Polischchuk, the court held that the Lemon Law did not 
require exhaustion of the mechanism prior to filing suit, and 
that the “first resort” requirement was satisfied by the 
plaintiffs’ allegations that they had forwarded a request for 





Id. at *2.6   
 Nissan moved for reconsideration, and in the 
alternative, to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for 
summary judgment.  In its motion, Nissan again represented that 
Harrison had failed to comply with the “first resort” requirement 
of the Lemon Law.  Nissan attached as an exhibit an affidavit 
from the director of the Eastern Pennsylvania BBB Auto Line 
Program who stated that, a few days after receiving Harrison's 
request for arbitration, she sent a letter to Harrison's counsel 
informing him that he had an affirmative duty to respond and 
                     
6.  There has been a recent proliferation of Lemon Law cases in 
the district courts of this Circuit regarding the import of the 
“first resort” requirement.  The question that has divided the 
district courts is whether, after requesting arbitration, 
claimants are entitled to resort to the district court 
immediately upon expiration of the forty-day period set forth in 
the FTC regulations if they have not heard from the contracting 
ADR agency, see Polischchuk v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. 94-6991, 
1995 WL 94798 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1995) (sending in request to BBB 
Auto Line and not receiving a response was sufficient); Jenkins 
v. General Motors Corp., No. 95-2710, 1995 WL 422680 (E.D. Pa. 
July 13, 1995) (issue of material fact precluded summary judgment 
as to whether plaintiff failed to ‘first resort’ to the informal 
dispute mechanism where plaintiff claimed that she was never sent 
a notice of hearing but defendant claimed it sent notice); Rudder 
v. American Motor Co., No. 94-6769, 1995 WL 216955 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 
12, 1995) (complaint dismissed where plaintiff refused to 
participate in ADR procedure after requesting arbitration and 
receiving notice of hearing); Morganstein v. General Motors 
Corp., No. 94-3795, 1994 WL 558822 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 1994) 
(claim dismissed where plaintiff filed a complaint rather than 
responding to notice of hearing from ADR procedure), or whether 
they must call or write so as to manifest a good faith effort to 
schedule the arbitration if the ADR body has not independently 
done so within that period, Levin v. American Honda Motor Co., 
No. 94-5380, 1994 WL 719856 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1994) (court 
dismissed claim without prejudice where plaintiff had requested 





schedule an arbitration hearing within five days.  The director 
represented that neither Harrison nor her counsel contacted the 
BBB regarding arbitration.  Therefore, a week after sending the 
letter, the BBB Auto Line closed the case.  The district court 
denied the motion for reconsideration as well.    
 II. 
 A. 
 The denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction is not appealable.  Commonwealth of Pa. v. 
Brown, 373 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967).  However, an order denying a 
motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act 
("FAA") is immediately appealable. 9 U.S.C. § 16.  Nissan submits 
that this Court has jurisdiction because the district court 
orders were equivalent to orders denying motions to compel 
arbitration under the FAA.   
 In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA to encourage courts 
to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts, contrary to prior 
common law which disfavored such agreements.  Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).  The FAA 
provides in this regard the following:  
A written provision in any...contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract or transaction, or the 
refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit 
to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such contract, transaction, or 
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist 





contract.   
 
9 U.S.C. § 2.  In furtherance of this provision, § 4 of the FAA 
authorizes a party to file a motion to compel arbitration if the 
other party refuses to comply with the agreement to arbitrate.  
Id. § 4.7 
 Section 16 of the FAA, passed in 1988, allows the 
interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to compel 
arbitration under the FAA.  The section was added to "make[] 
clear that any order favoring litigation over arbitration is 
immediately appealable and any order favoring arbitration over 
litigation is not."  Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc, 878 
F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1989).  Nissan argues that, since the 
district court chose litigation over arbitration, the orders are 
immediately appealable.8 
                     
7.   § 4 provides:   
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of 
another to arbitrate under a written agreement for 
arbitration may petition any United States district 
court which, save for such agreement, would have 
jurisdiction under Title 28 in a civil action or in 
admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out 
of the controversy between the parties, for an order 
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner 
provided for in such agreement. . . .  The court shall 
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the 
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure 
to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall 
make an order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. . . .  If the making of the arbitration 
agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to 
perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed 
summarily to the trial thereof. 
8.  We note as a threshold matter that, for the FAA to apply, the 





 Nissan’s jurisdictional argument, however, faces two 
significant hurdles, both of which present issues of potential 
first impression for this Court.  First, it is not evident that 
Nissan's motion to dismiss was a sufficient surrogate for a 
motion to compel arbitration under the FAA to enable us to 
sustain appellate jurisdiction under § 16.  Second, it is unclear 
whether the FAA applies to an agreement to participate in an 
"informal dispute resolution mechanism," such as the BBB Auto 
Line. 
 Turning to the first question, we note that other 
courts have treated a motion to dismiss for failure to arbitrate 
claims as a motion to compel arbitration.  See Hercules & Co. v. 
Beltway Carpet Serv., 592 A.2d 1069, 1071-72 (D.C. App. 1991) 
(..continued) 
of a written agreement that contains an arbitration clause and 
affects interstate commerce.  See 9 U.S.C. § 1, § 2, and § 4.  
The point is not free from doubt in the case at bar.  However, 
leaving aside for a moment the (cognate) question whether the ADR 
procedure at issue here is "arbitration" within the meaning of 
the FAA, the point we find case-dispositive, see infra, we are 
satisfied that there is a sufficient agreement qua agreement.   
Although the warranty states that the use of the BBB Auto Line is 
voluntary, and it alone does not constitute a sufficient written 
agreement, the warranty constituted an offer to arbitrate that 
was accepted by the written request for arbitration sent by 
Harrison's counsel to the BBB Auto Line, the manner of acceptance 
prescribed by the offer, see Kroeze v. Chloride Group Ltd., 572 
F.2d 1099, 1105 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The offeror is the master of 
his offer.  An offeror may prescribe as many conditions, terms or 
the like as he may wish, including but not limited to, the time, 
place and method of acceptance."); Glenway Indus., Inc. v. 
Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 686 F.2d 415, 417 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(same).  Alternatively, Harrison's counsel's letter to the BBB 
Auto Line constituted an offer to arbitrate which was accepted by 
Nissan’s reply to the BBB Auto Line that it would arbitrate the 






(holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to 
arbitrate was appealable under the D.C. arbitration statute, 
which is similar to the FAA); Interstate Securities Corp. v. 
Siegel, 676 F. Supp. 54, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (motion to dismiss 
treated as a motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings 
until completion of arbitration).9  There is, of course, logic to 
this construction.  On the other hand, linguistically, a motion 
to dismiss, even for failure to pursue the statutorily provided 
threshold arbitral remedy, is a far cry from a "motion to compel 
arbitration."  Fortunately, we need not resolve this question 
here because of our resolution of the second issue before us.10  
 B. 
 We turn to the question whether the FAA cognizes an 
agreement to submit to the ADR procedure at issue here.  Harrison 
contends that, because the BBB Auto Line arbitration is 
nonbinding (at least on the claimant), the FAA is not applicable 
here.  Contrary to Harrison’s contention, there is authority for 
the proposition that a court may issue an order compelling 
                     
9.  We note, too, the policy favoring the avoidance of 
jurisdictional-based dismissals that might waste judicial 
resources.  See, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 
U.S. 826 (1989) (holding that the courts of appeals may grant a 
motion to dismiss a dispensable party when dismissal is required 
to maintain diversity jurisdiction and results in no prejudice to 
any of the parties, even though no statute specifically 
authorizes granting the motion at the appellate level). 
10.  Judge Roth would hold that, under the facts of this case, a 
motion to dismiss is not a surrogate for a motion to compel 





nonbinding arbitration under the FAA.  See AMF Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp. 621 F. Supp. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (court could compel 
the parties to submit their dispute to third party for an 
advisory non-binding opinion under the FAA); Kelley v. Benchmark 
Homes, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 640 (Neb. 1996) (FAA applies to non-
binding arbitration).  Moreover, New York appellate courts have 
held that, under the New York Arbitration Act, courts should 
enforce agreements to submit disputes to nonbinding arbitration, 
see Board of Educ. v. Cracovia, 321 N.Y.S.2d 496 (App. Div. 1971) 
(court can compel arbitration although the arbitration may be 
advisory rather than binding), and the Federal Arbitration Act 
was modeled after the New York Arbitration Act.  See S. Rep. No. 
536, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1924).  These courts have pointed 
out that the arbitration acts were designed to encourage courts 
to enforce agreements to arbitrate, and have suggested that this 
policy is no less compelling where the parties have agreed to 
submit their disputes to nonbinding arbitration.  
 Perhaps the most useful approach to the question 
whether the FAA applies to nonbinding arbitration is that of 
Judge Weinstein in AMF v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).  In that case, Judge Weinstein enforced an 
agreement to submit a dispute to nonbinding arbitration.  He, 
however, did not explicitly hold that the FAA applies to all 
forms of non-binding arbitration; rather, he relied on § 2 of the 





settle [disputes] by arbitration,” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). 
 Thus focusing the question on whether the arbitration at issue 
there might realistically settle the dispute, Judge Weinstein 
held that "[v]iewed in the light of reasonable commercial 
expectations the dispute will be settled by this arbitration."  
Id. at 461. 
 Considering the Auto Line mechanism in light of Judge 
Weinstein’s approach, the question whether the nonbinding 
character of the procedures precludes the application of the FAA 
is close.  Harrison contends that the requirements for Lemon Law 
mechanisms are such that there is no reasonable expectation that 
resort to the mechanism will settle the dispute.  In this regard, 
Harrison argues that the Lemon Law and the FAA are a mismatch.  
The FAA was intended to apply to those contracts that show a true 
undertaking by both parties to arbitrate the dispute.  But Lemon 
Law mechanisms are conditional and one-sided -- in particular, 
decisions are not binding on the claimants and claimants may file 
suit after forty days if a decision is not forthcoming -- and it 
cannot be said, according to Harrison, that claimants under all 
circumstances undertake to settle their disputes when they submit 
them to Lemon law arbitration.   
 At oral argument, Harrison’s counsel also pointed out 
that a Lemon Law claimant will almost always file suit after the 
completion of the BBB Auto Line procedures because the BBB Auto 





plaintiff can receive under the Lemon Law.  Moreover, a Lemon Law 
plaintiff will usually have other causes of action against the 
dealer or manufacturer (e.g., Consumer Fraud Act, UCC) that can 
only be resolved through litigation.  In sum, Harrison credibly 
asserts that there is no reasonable commercial expectation that 
the disputes will be resolved through the BBB Auto Line. 
 Nissan rejoins that the purpose of the Lemon Law “first 
resort” requirement is to encourage manufacturers to establish 
informal dispute resolution mechanisms through which the bulk of 
warranty disputes can be resolved fairly and quickly without 
resort to litigation.  Under this view, the FTC regulations are 
slanted in favor of consumers to ensure that the informal dispute 
resolution procedures are as fair as possible to the consumers.  
Because of the safeguards guaranteeing fairness, Nissan contends 
that there is a reasonable expectation that Lemon Law disputes 
will be resolved by the BBB Auto Line.  If there was no 
expectation that these procedures would settle the majority of 
such disputes, Nissan forcefully points out, automobile 
manufacturers would refuse to bear the cost of creating 
mechanisms such as the BBB Auto Line.  
 We also acknowledge the force of Nissan's arguments 
that Congress intended to provide for the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce 
Clause, see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987), and that 





commerce is "binding," "partially binding" or "not binding at 
all" may have nothing to do with "the full reach of the Commerce 
Clause."  All that is required for any such agreement to trigger 
the Commerce Clause, the argument continues, is that it pertain 
to a matter affecting interstate commerce, and the agreement 
involved in this case does.  However, we need not reach the 
question whether the FAA applies to nonbinding arbitration in 
general, or whether the nonbinding character of the BBB Auto Line 
prevents the application of the FAA to this particular case, 
because we are satisfied that the informal dispute resolution 
procedure provided by Nissan pursuant to the Lemon Law and the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is not “arbitration” as contemplated 
by the FAA. 
 We note first that the FAA does not define the term 
“arbitration,” and both courts and commentators have struggled to 
do so.  This debate has occurred largely in the context of 
whether the FAA applies to nonbinding arbitration, as we 
explained above.  Judge Weinstein has pointed out that 
arbitration has been defined in different ways, and “[a]t no time 
have the courts insisted on a rigid or formalistic approach to a 
definition of arbitration.”  AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 460.  In 
defining arbitration for purposes of determining whether the 
nonbinding arbitration clause before him was subject to 
enforcement under the FAA, he concluded that “[a]rbitration is 





judicial process.  If the parties have agreed to submit a dispute 
for a decision by a third party, they have agreed to 
arbitration.”  Id.   
 Although it defies easy definition, the essence of 
arbitration, we think, is that, when the parties agree to submit 
their disputes to it, they have agreed to arbitrate these 
disputes through to completion, i.e. to an award made by a third-
party arbitrator.  Arbitration does not occur until the process 
is completed and the arbitrator makes a decision.  Hence, if one 
party seeks an order compelling arbitration and it is granted, 
the parties must then arbitrate their dispute to an arbitrators’ 
decision, and cannot seek recourse to the courts before that 
time.  Cf. Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, ___ F.3d ___, 
1997 WL 153012 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Once a dispute is determined to 
be validly arbitrable, all other issues are to be decided at 
arbitration.”). 
 But the informal alternative dispute resolution process 
contemplated by the Lemon Law does not fit this characterization. 
 Rather, while many cases in which claimants invoke the informal 
process will proceed to an arbitrator’s award, some will not.  
That is because, under the FTC regulations with which a mechanism 
must comply, a dissatisfied car owner can file suit under the 
Lemon Law if he or she has not received a decision from the 
arbitrator after forty days.  In other words, whatever the 





barred from pursuing litigation under the Lemon Law if the 
mechanism delays for more than forty days.  The claimant would 
not, therefore, pursue the procedure to completion in all cases. 
 Under all these circumstances, the informal dispute resolution 
mechanism provided for by Nissan pursuant to the Lemon Law does 
not constitute arbitration within the meaning of the FAA. 
 This conclusion is supported by the policies that 
underlie the Lemon Law.  Consumer statutes, such as the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act and the Lemon laws, were enacted under the 
assumption that manufacturers are often reluctant to provide the 
relief to consumers that their warranties promise.  See H.R. Rep. 
93-1107, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702 (“Another growing 
source of resentment has been the inability to get many . . . 
products properly repaired and the developing awareness that the 
paper with the filigree border bearing the bold caption 
‘Warranty’ . . . was often of no greater worth than the paper it 
was printed on.”).   
 Therefore, the consumer laws and the FTC regulations 
promulgated to guide providers of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms are slanted toward the consumer: consumers must comply 
with only minimal requirements, while the warrantors must follow 
more elaborate and more burdensome rules, 16 C.F.R. § 703.2, and, 
moreover, are bound by the results of the arbitration, see 73 
P.S. § 1959.  Additionally, the contracting ADR agency must 





them is the requirement that the body not delay its decision for 
more than forty days, with only few exceptions.  16 C.F.R. § 
703.5(d), (e) & (i).  Applying the FAA to these procedures would 
arguably frustrate the policies underlying the consumer laws by 
placing additional burdens on consumers.  That is, if forced to 
arbitrate their disputes with the manufacturers to an 
arbitrator’s decision in every case, consumers would face 
additional hurdles that were not contemplated by the drafters of 
the Lemon Law. 
 We find further support for the conclusion that the FAA 
does not apply to Lemon Law ADR procedures in the fact that the 
Lemon Law, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and the FTC 
regulations all refer to the procedure at issue as an “informal 
dispute resolution procedure.”  If the drafters had intended this 
procedure to be cognizable under the FAA, then it is likely that 
they would have referred to it as “arbitration.”  Indeed, the 
term “arbitration” has come into this case solely because the BBB 
Auto Line has labeled the second part of its procedures 
“arbitration.”  That alone is not sufficient to trigger the FAA. 
 We, therefore, hold that Harrison and Nissan did not enter into 
a contract to arbitrate their dispute within the meaning of the 
FAA and that we lack jurisdiction over Nissan’s appeal. 
 In reaching this holding, we acknowledge the force of 
Nissan’s contention that refusing to extend the FAA to Lemon Law 
arbitration would make 





rather than encourage, manufacturers from establishing 
and making available such mechanisms, and delay 
resolution of consumer warranty claims.  That would be 
in a direct conflict with the expressly stated 
Congressional policy of "encourag[ing] warrantors to 
establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are 
fairly and expeditiously settled through informal 
dispute settlement mechanisms.” 
 
We are sympathetic to Nissan’s concerns, and view with disfavor 
the apparent policy of some Lemon Law counsel of “going through 
the motions” of the alternative dispute resolution process to get 
quickly into court, rather than trying to effect a speedy 
resolution of the claim through the ADR procedures.11  We also 
understand that such tactics might frustrate the policies behind 
the Pennsylvania Lemon Law.  But such an argument cannot and does 
not control the question whether § 16 of the FAA permits our 
                     
11.  We note in this regard that representations made during oral 
argument on the question of the extent to which the “first 
resort” requires Lemon Law claimants to exhaust the available ADR 
procedures before filing suit were troubling.  Counsel for Ms. 
Harrison, who concededly has one of the largest Lemon Law 
practices in Southeastern Pennsylvania, acknowledged during oral 
argument that he has never participated in a BBB Auto Line 
arbitration, observing that “the program cannot provide what our 
clients want.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. at 47.  Nissan asserts, against 
this background, that Harrison’s contention that the consumer 
should be able to satisfy the "first resort" requirement by the 
simple act of "requesting" arbitration and then refusing to 
participate further is suspect.  In Nissan's submission, 
counsel's actions and contentions are contrary to the very 
purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the state lemon 
laws, which is to encourage manufacturers to establish informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms so that the bulk of warranty 
disputes can be quickly and inexpensively resolved in unbiased 
neutral nonjudicial forums.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1).  We 
could not, of course, decide what the Lemon Law requires in the 
way of first resort even if it were before us, because of the 
absence of a record.  We assume that the matter will come before 
us after final judgment in one of the district courts of this 





asserting appellate jurisdiction in this case. 
C. 
 Nissan has not argued that these orders entered by the 
district court are collaterally appealable.  See Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).  At all 
events, there is no support for treating the orders as such.  To 
satisfy Cohen, the order must be conclusive, resolve an important 
issue severable from the merits of the action, and be effectively 
unreviewable upon appeal from the final order.  The district 
court's orders do not meet these requirements.  The fact that an 
order will require a party to continue to litigate the matter 
does not alone make the order effectively unreviewable.  See 
Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (district court order 
denying a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause in 
a contract was not a collaterally appealable order under Cohen); 
Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 
(1994) (district court's order vacating dismissal based on 
settlement agreement that would protect settling parties from 
trial was not a collaterally appealable order).  Therefore, there 
is no other basis for exercising appellate jurisdiction. 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's orders 
denying appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and appellant's motion for reconsideration are not 





for lack of appellate jurisdiction.   
